Liberty Broadband-C
LBRDKHeld by 7 superinvestors.
SEC 10-K · fundamentals
Business quality
As of 2025-12-31- Revenue growth
- —
- Net margin
- —
- ROE
- -47.0%
- FCF margin
- —
Fundamentals data incomplete — read with care.
What makes a business high qualityValuation · value band
Valuation
No usable market price is available, so this page does not place price on the value gauge.
Method & numbers
A conservative intrinsic-value band (zero-growth floor to growth-capped DCF) plus a tangible asset floor — not investment advice, not a buy/sell signal, and not a price target.
Owner-earnings DCF $51.63 – $86.69
Moat Below asset base · terminal value 45% of present value.
Graham earnings-power value (normalized NOPAT)
Normalized operating earnings net of maintenance capex are non-positive over the years shown; earnings power cannot be capitalized.
Normalized NOPAT = average operating margin over the years shown × latest-year revenue × (1 − normalized tax); then + D&A − maintenance capex (write A). Unlevered (pre-interest, attributable to all capital). Capitalized at the 9–11% rate band (read as a WACC proxy). Enterprise → equity bridge applied: + cash − total debt.
Years: 2024, 2023, 2022, 2021, 2020
v1 simplifications: Maintenance capex (degraded) deducted in full cash (write A): EPV = (NOPAT + D&A − maintenance capex) / WACC; no tax shield on the capex term. Only one maintenance-capex method available; estimate is degraded. Share-based compensation is left as a real expense (not added back).
Buffett owner-earnings value$49.48 – $59.71 / sh
Owner earnings = average net income + average D&A − maintenance capex (zero-growth floor; no ΔNWC). Levered (starts from net income, already after interest — an equity-holder stream). Capitalized at the 9.7–11.7% band (9–11% base + 0.7pp leverage premium). No enterprise→equity bridge: the capitalized result is already equity value (subtracting debt would double-count interest).
Years: 2024, 2023, 2022, 2021, 2020
v1 simplifications: Owner earnings = net income + D&A − maintenance capex (degraded); the working-capital change is excluded (maintenance ΔNWC ≈ 0; growth ΔNWC is carried in growth value, not double-counted). Only one maintenance-capex method available; estimate is degraded. One-time items are not separately normalized (multi-year averaging smooths them partially). Share-based compensation is left as a real expense (not added back); see the SBC/OE disclosure. Capitalized at the 9–11% base band plus a 0.7pp leverage premium (cost of equity rises with leverage — MM Proposition II). Net debt is about 4.3 years of owner earnings, adding 0.7pp of cost-of-equity risk premium.
Reproduction value = tangible net assets $8.63B = $60.33 / sh. Tangible net assets = shareholders' equity − goodwill − intangibles, ÷ diluted shares (no R&D history to capitalize).
Moat reading: Franchise test compares earnings power (EPV) against reproduction value on both AV_conservative (tangible + capitalized R&D) and AV_reproduction (conservative + acquired-reset proxy). Both must clear the franchise multiple for a moat signal; near it, a commodity; below it, value destruction. A directional reading, not a verdict.
Growth value gated to zero — no moat or ROIIC ≤ WACC, so no growth value is credited.
Window FY 2024, 2023, 2022, 2021, 2020 · discount band 9%–11% · normalized tax 15% (Average effective tax rate over 5 year(s), capped at the statutory 21%.) · diluted shares.
Baseline 9%–11%, net debt ≈ 4.3 years of owner earnings → +0.7pp cost-of-equity premium → effective 9.7%–11.7%.
Owner-earnings DCF: growth g₁ 5% · OE FY 2024, 2023, 2022, 2021, 2020 · Discount band: 10.27%–12.67% (DGS10 +4.5% to a 12% strict end, each +0.67pp for leverage premium, as of 2026-10-15). No enterprise→equity bridge: owner earnings already flow to shareholders (post-interest), so no net cash is added and no debt subtracted — matching the engine owner-earnings lamp.
SEC 13F · holders
Superinvestors Holding This Security
7 holders · $510.4M combined · this quarter +0 opened / -0 exited
- Value$219.0MWeight (prev→now)1.1% → 0.7% ▼
- Value$154.4MWeight (prev→now)3.3% → 1.9% ▼
- Value$87.8MWeight (prev→now)0.3% → 0.1% ▼
- Value$19.2MWeight (prev→now)2.0% → 1.3% ▼
- Value$17.5MWeight (prev→now)0.0% → 0.0% ▼
- Value$10.1MWeight (prev→now)1.0% → 0.2% ▼
- Value$2.5MWeight (prev→now)0.0% → 0.0% ▼
SEC 13F · notes
Written summary
Written summary
Liberty Broadband-C (LBRDK) is held by 7 of the superinvestors tracked on Compounder, with a combined $510.4M in reported 13F value. The largest position belongs to Ravenel Boykin Curry, where it makes up 0.7% of the portfolio.
Other notable holders by value include Steven Romick (1.9% of its book), Bill Nygren (0.1% of its book) and Wallace Weitz (1.3% of its book).
In the quarter ended 2026-06-30, 0 of the tracked filers opened a new position in LBRDK, 2 added to existing ones, 4 trimmed, and 0 sold out entirely.
Holder counts and values reflect the most recent SEC Form 13F filings, through the quarter ended 2026-06-30. Source: SEC EDGAR. A 13F shows only long US-listed positions and can lag the real portfolio by up to 45 days, so this is disclosed long ownership, not a complete picture.
SEC 13F · co-ownership
Also held by these investors
Investors holding Liberty Broadband-C (LBRDK) also commonly hold →
- Meta Platforms Inc-Class AMETA7 holders
- Alphabet Inc-Cl CGOOG7 holders
- Alphabet Inc-Cl AGOOGL6 holders
- Amazon.Com IncAMZN6 holders
- Microsoft CorpMSFT6 holders
- Capital One Financial CorpCOF6 holders
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Sources· SEC EDGAR 13F as of 2026-06-30 · filed 2026-08-14
Educational data only — not investment advice. 13F positions are self-reported and can lag up to 45 days.
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