Monster Beverage Corp
Held by 2 superinvestors (MNST).
Educational data only — not investment advice. 13F positions are self-reported and can lag up to 45 days.
Valuation
Valuation · two methods
Earnings Power & Asset Floor
Two intrinsic-value methods and a tangible asset floor — deterministic, not price forecasts or recommendations.
Monster Beverage Corp (MNST): Two methods value the business — a conservative owner-earnings DCF and a growth-credited Greenwald estimate, $16–$36 / sh. Today’s price sits above both (price $98 as of 2026-07-02).
Model cautions
- The DCF result diverges from a zero-growth sanity check (over 50%).
- The two methods’ midpoints differ materially — growth assumptions warrant review (over 20%).
- Growth nearly matches the discount rate — the estimate is sensitive to assumptions.
An observation from two valuation methods — not investment advice, not a buy/sell signal, and not a price target.
Price as of 2026-07-02 · yahoo · DGS10 4.5% @ 2026-07-01.
Method & numbers
Owner-earnings DCF $15.62 – $26.61 · Greenwald $26.99 – $35.55 (neutral $31.04) · zero-growth base $22.88 · reproduction $5.63
Moat Franchise (moat) · terminal value 42% of present value · owner-earnings yield 2% vs 10Y 4.5%.
Graham earnings-power value (normalized NOPAT)$19.10 – $22.88 / sh
Normalized NOPAT = average operating margin over the years shown × latest-year revenue × (1 − normalized tax); then + D&A − maintenance capex (write A). Unlevered (pre-interest, attributable to all capital). Capitalized at the 9–11% rate band (read as a WACC proxy). Enterprise → equity bridge applied: + cash − total debt.
Years: 2025, 2024, 2023, 2022, 2021
v1 simplifications: Maintenance capex (degraded) deducted in full cash (write A): EPV = (NOPAT + D&A − maintenance capex) / WACC; no tax shield on the capex term. Maintenance-capex methods diverge by 76% (> 50%); estimate is degraded. Share-based compensation is left as a real expense (not added back).
Buffett owner-earnings value$13.76 – $16.81 / sh
Owner earnings = average net income + average D&A − maintenance capex (zero-growth floor; no ΔNWC). Levered (starts from net income, already after interest — an equity-holder stream). Capitalized at the 9–11% rate band (read as a cost-of-equity proxy). No enterprise→equity bridge: the capitalized result is already equity value (subtracting debt would double-count interest).
Years: 2025, 2024, 2023, 2022, 2021
v1 simplifications: Owner earnings = net income + D&A − maintenance capex (degraded); the working-capital change is excluded (maintenance ΔNWC ≈ 0; growth ΔNWC is carried in growth value, not double-counted). One-time items are not separately normalized (multi-year averaging smooths them partially). Share-based compensation is left as a real expense (not added back); see the SBC/OE disclosure. Capitalized at the same 9–11% band as a cost-of-equity proxy (theoretically the cost of equity is higher; v2 simplification, v3 to refine).
Reproduction value = tangible net assets $5.54B = $5.63 / sh. Tangible net assets = shareholders' equity − goodwill − intangibles, ÷ diluted shares (no R&D history to capitalize).
Moat reading: Franchise test compares earnings power (EPV) against reproduction value (tangible net assets + capitalized R&D). EPV well above reproduction value signals a moat; near it, a commodity; below it, value destruction. A directional reading, not a verdict.
Growth value: if the moat holds for 10 yr at ROIIC ≈ 50%, $4.11–$12.68 / sh (neutral $8.16). Conservative, not a forecast.
Window FY 2025, 2024, 2023, 2022, 2021 · discount band 9%–11% · normalized tax 21% (Average effective tax rate over 5 year(s), capped at the statutory 21%.) · diluted shares.
Owner-earnings DCF: growth g₁ 8% · OE FY 2025, 2024, 2023, 2022, 2021 · Discount band: 8.98%–12.00% (DGS10 +4.5% to a 12% strict end, as of 2026-07-01). No enterprise→equity bridge: owner earnings already flow to shareholders (post-interest), so no net cash is added and no debt subtracted — matching the engine owner-earnings lamp. Two-method midpoint gap 32%.
Ownership · 13F consensus
Who's buying it
Institutional ownership aggregated across funds — consensus strength and this quarter's moves. Describes actions, not advice.
2 superinvestors hold it · $234.5M combined
Largest holder Lee Ainslie
Held by 2 superinvestors of Monster Beverage Corp (MNST); this quarter 2 trimmed (as of 2026-03-31).
13F positions are self-reported and can lag up to 45 days. Informational only — not investment advice.
Next · is it cheap
Want to see which stocks look cheap against a conservative value band?
Browse all valued stocks, ranked by value bandSuperinvestors Holding This Security
- Value$178.6MWeight (prev→now)2.2% → 2.1% ▼
- Value$55.9MWeight (prev→now)0.2% → 0.2% ▼
Ownership overview
Monster Beverage Corp (MNST) is held by 2 of the superinvestors tracked on Compounder, with a combined $234.5M in reported 13F value. The largest position belongs to Lee Ainslie, where it makes up 2.1% of the portfolio.
Other notable holders by value include Ray Dalio (0.2% of its book).
Over the latest quarter, 0 of the tracked filers opened a new position in MNST, 0 added to existing ones, 2 trimmed, and 0 sold out entirely.
Holder counts and values reflect the most recent SEC Form 13F filings, through the quarter ended 2026-03-31. Source: SEC EDGAR. A 13F shows only long US-listed positions and can lag the real portfolio by up to 45 days, so this is disclosed long ownership, not a complete picture.
Holders over time
Superinvestors holding this security over the last 8 quarters: 1 → 2.
Early quarters may understate holder counts due to data backfill — read the slope with care.
Sources· SEC EDGAR 13F as of 2026-03-31 · filed 2026-05-15
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