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Compounder

Penn Entertainment Inc

Held by 4 superinvestors (PENN).

Educational data only — not investment advice. 13F positions are self-reported and can lag up to 45 days.

Valuation

Valuation · two methods

Earnings Power & Asset Floor

Two intrinsic-value methods and a tangible asset floor — deterministic, not price forecasts or recommendations.

High leverage — ranges are a degraded approximation (see method).

Graham earnings-power value (normalized NOPAT) Normalized operating earnings net of maintenance capex are non-positive over the years shown; earnings power cannot be capitalized.Buffett owner-earnings value Normalized owner earnings are non-positive over the years shown; earnings power cannot be capitalized.
Reproduction value Moat Below asset base (directional)

Zero-growth intrinsic ranges and a tangible asset floor — not investment advice, not a buy/sell signal, and not a price target.

Method & numbers

Moat Below asset base.

Graham earnings-power value (normalized NOPAT)

Normalized operating earnings net of maintenance capex are non-positive over the years shown; earnings power cannot be capitalized.

Normalized NOPAT = average operating margin over the years shown × latest-year revenue × (1 − normalized tax); then + D&A − maintenance capex (write A). Unlevered (pre-interest, attributable to all capital). Capitalized at the 9–11% rate band (read as a WACC proxy). Enterprise → equity bridge applied: + cash − total debt.

Years: 2025, 2024, 2023, 2022, 2021

v1 simplifications: Maintenance capex unavailable → degraded to the v1 simplification (maintenance capex = D&A, so the depreciation add-back nets to zero). Share-based compensation is left as a real expense (not added back). Operating margin is below its multi-year average (cyclical/declining): normalized margin capped at the latest year — no peak-margin capitalization (audit #2).

Buffett owner-earnings value

Normalized owner earnings are non-positive over the years shown; earnings power cannot be capitalized.

Owner earnings = average net income + average D&A − maintenance capex (zero-growth floor; no ΔNWC). Levered (starts from net income, already after interest — an equity-holder stream). Capitalized at the 9–11% rate band (read as a cost-of-equity proxy). No enterprise→equity bridge: the capitalized result is already equity value (subtracting debt would double-count interest).

Years: 2025, 2024, 2023, 2022, 2021

v1 simplifications: Net income is below its multi-year average (cyclical/declining): normalized owner earnings anchored to the latest year — no peak-earnings capitalization (audit #2). Maintenance capex or D&A unavailable → degraded to normalized net income (= average net income over the years shown). One-time items are not separately normalized (multi-year averaging smooths them partially). Share-based compensation is left as a real expense (not added back); see the SBC/OE disclosure. Capitalized at the same 9–11% band as a cost-of-equity proxy (theoretically the cost of equity is higher; v2 simplification, v3 to refine).

Asset floor: Tangible net assets = shareholders' equity − goodwill − intangibles, ÷ diluted shares (no R&D history to capitalize).

Moat reading: Franchise test compares earnings power (EPV) against reproduction value (tangible net assets + capitalized R&D). EPV well above reproduction value signals a moat; near it, a commodity; below it, value destruction. A directional reading, not a verdict.

Growth value gated to zero — no moat / ROIIC ≤ WACC, so no growth value is credited.

Window FY 2025, 2024, 2023, 2022, 2021 · discount band 9%11% · normalized tax 0% (Average effective tax rate over 5 year(s), capped at the statutory 21%.) · diluted shares.

High leverage (net debt / shareholders' equity above 1.0): the single 9–11% rate band is a low-leverage / net-cash approximation and is directionally distorted here. The ranges are shown but should be read as degraded.

Ownership · 13F consensus

Who's buying it

Institutional ownership aggregated across funds — consensus strength and this quarter's moves. Describes actions, not advice.

4 superinvestors hold it · $94.9M combined

This quarter2 opened

Largest holder David Einhorn

Held by 4 superinvestors of Penn Entertainment Inc (PENN); this quarter 2 opened (as of 2026-03-31).

13F positions are self-reported and can lag up to 45 days. Informational only — not investment advice.

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Superinvestors Holding This Security

  • Value$90.8MWeight (prev→now)3.1% 2.8%
  • Value$2.3MWeight (prev→now)New · 0.0%
  • Value$958,899Weight (prev→now)New · 0.0%
  • Value$825,147Weight (prev→now)0.0% 0.0%

Ownership overview

Penn Entertainment Inc (PENN) is held by 4 of the superinvestors tracked on Compounder, with a combined $94.9M in reported 13F value. The largest position belongs to David Einhorn, where it makes up 2.8% of the portfolio.

Other notable holders by value include Ray Dalio (0.0% of its book), Lee Ainslie (0.0% of its book) and Prem Watsa (0.0% of its book).

Over the latest quarter, 2 of the tracked filers opened a new position in PENN, 0 added to existing ones, 0 trimmed, and 0 sold out entirely.

Holder counts and values reflect the most recent SEC Form 13F filings, through the quarter ended 2026-03-31. Source: SEC EDGAR. A 13F shows only long US-listed positions and can lag the real portfolio by up to 45 days, so this is disclosed long ownership, not a complete picture.

Holders over time

Superinvestors holding this security over the last 8 quarters: 1 → 4.

Early quarters may understate holder counts due to data backfill — read the slope with care.

Key facts & links

Ticker
PENN
Total value held
$94.9M
Largest holder
David Einhorn
External

Sources· SEC EDGAR 13F as of 2026-03-31 · filed 2026-05-15

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