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Compounder

Caesars Entertainment Inc

Held by 2 superinvestors (CZR).

Educational data only — not investment advice. 13F positions are self-reported and can lag up to 45 days.

Valuation

Valuation · two methods

Earnings Power & Asset Floor

Two intrinsic-value methods and a tangible asset floor — deterministic, not price forecasts or recommendations.

High leverage — ranges are a degraded approximation (see method).

Margin of safetyPrice sits below this method’ value estimate.
margin of safety
fair value
above fair value
$30
cheaper$52 – $52 value estimatepricier

Caesars Entertainment Inc (CZR): A conservative earnings-power estimate, $52–$52 / sh; today’s price sits below it (price $30 as of 2026-07-02).

An observation from two valuation methods — not investment advice, not a buy/sell signal, and not a price target.

Price as of 2026-07-02 · yahoo.

Method & numbers

· Greenwald zero-growth $52.19 · zero-growth base $52.19

Moat Not assessable.

Graham earnings-power value (normalized NOPAT)$33.17 – $52.19 / sh

Normalized NOPAT = average operating margin over the years shown × latest-year revenue × (1 − normalized tax); then + D&A − maintenance capex (write A). Unlevered (pre-interest, attributable to all capital). Capitalized at the 9–11% rate band (read as a WACC proxy). Enterprise → equity bridge applied: + cash − total debt.

Years: 2025, 2024, 2023, 2022, 2021

v1 simplifications: Maintenance capex (degraded) deducted in full cash (write A): EPV = (NOPAT + D&A − maintenance capex) / WACC; no tax shield on the capex term. Maintenance-capex methods diverge by 106% (> 50%); estimate is degraded. Share-based compensation is left as a real expense (not added back). Operating margin is below its multi-year average (cyclical/declining): normalized margin capped at the latest year — no peak-margin capitalization (audit #2).

Buffett owner-earnings value

Normalized owner earnings are non-positive over the years shown; earnings power cannot be capitalized.

Owner earnings = average net income + average D&A − maintenance capex (zero-growth floor; no ΔNWC). Levered (starts from net income, already after interest — an equity-holder stream). Capitalized at the 9–11% rate band (read as a cost-of-equity proxy). No enterprise→equity bridge: the capitalized result is already equity value (subtracting debt would double-count interest).

Years: 2025, 2024, 2023, 2022, 2021

v1 simplifications: Net income is below its multi-year average (cyclical/declining): normalized owner earnings anchored to the latest year — no peak-earnings capitalization (audit #2). Owner earnings = net income + D&A − maintenance capex (degraded); the working-capital change is excluded (maintenance ΔNWC ≈ 0; growth ΔNWC is carried in growth value, not double-counted). One-time items are not separately normalized (multi-year averaging smooths them partially). Share-based compensation is left as a real expense (not added back); see the SBC/OE disclosure. Capitalized at the same 9–11% band as a cost-of-equity proxy (theoretically the cost of equity is higher; v2 simplification, v3 to refine).

Asset floor: Tangible net assets = shareholders' equity − goodwill − intangibles, ÷ diluted shares (no R&D history to capitalize).

Moat reading: Franchise test compares earnings power (EPV) against reproduction value (tangible net assets + capitalized R&D). EPV well above reproduction value signals a moat; near it, a commodity; below it, value destruction. A directional reading, not a verdict.

Growth value gated to zero — no moat / ROIIC ≤ WACC, so no growth value is credited.

Window FY 2025, 2024, 2023, 2022, 2021 · discount band 9%11% · normalized tax 21% (Average effective tax rate over 5 year(s), capped at the statutory 21%.) · diluted shares.

High leverage (net debt / shareholders' equity above 1.0): the single 9–11% rate band is a low-leverage / net-cash approximation and is directionally distorted here. The ranges are shown but should be read as degraded.

Ownership · 13F consensus

Who's buying it

Institutional ownership aggregated across funds — consensus strength and this quarter's moves. Describes actions, not advice.

2 superinvestors hold it · $65.0M combined

This quarter1 opened

Largest holder Carl Icahn

Held by 2 superinvestors of Caesars Entertainment Inc (CZR); this quarter 1 opened (as of 2026-03-31).

13F positions are self-reported and can lag up to 45 days. Informational only — not investment advice.

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Superinvestors Holding This Security

  • Value$64.5MWeight (prev→now)0.7% 0.8%
  • Value$511,553Weight (prev→now)New · 0.0%

Ownership overview

Caesars Entertainment Inc (CZR) is held by 2 of the superinvestors tracked on Compounder, with a combined $65.0M in reported 13F value. The largest position belongs to Carl Icahn, where it makes up 0.8% of the portfolio.

Other notable holders by value include Ray Dalio (0.0% of its book).

Over the latest quarter, 1 of the tracked filers opened a new position in CZR, 0 added to existing ones, 0 trimmed, and 0 sold out entirely.

Holder counts and values reflect the most recent SEC Form 13F filings, through the quarter ended 2026-03-31. Source: SEC EDGAR. A 13F shows only long US-listed positions and can lag the real portfolio by up to 45 days, so this is disclosed long ownership, not a complete picture.

Holders over time

Superinvestors holding this security over the last 8 quarters: 2 → 2.

Early quarters may understate holder counts due to data backfill — read the slope with care.

Key facts & links

Ticker
CZR
Total value held
$65.0M
Largest holder
Carl Icahn
External

Sources· SEC EDGAR 13F as of 2026-03-31 · filed 2026-05-15

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