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Gitlab Inc-Cl A

GTLB

Held by 3 superinvestors.

Price$34.07
Holders3
Total value$36.7M

SEC 10-K · fundamentals

Business quality

as of 2026-01-31
Revenue growth
+25.8%
Net margin
-5.9%
ROE
-5.6%
FCF margin
23.2%
Revenue $152.2M → $955.2M · 6y
What makes a business high quality

Valuation · value band

Valuation

No usable market price is available, so this page does not place price on the value gauge.

Method & numbers

Buybacks over the years shown roughly only offset stock-based-compensation dilution — read them as maintaining the share count, not a net return of capital.

Model cautions

  • Capex doubled within two years: maintenance is floored then capped at D&A (OE may look optimistic); Greenwald growth value is closed — growth credit stays in the owner-earnings DCF only.

A conservative intrinsic-value band (zero-growth floor to growth-capped DCF) plus a tangible asset floor — not investment advice, not a buy/sell signal, and not a price target.

· reproduction $9.79

Moat Below asset base.

Graham earnings-power value (normalized NOPAT)

Normalized operating earnings net of maintenance capex are non-positive over the years shown; earnings power cannot be capitalized.

Normalized NOPAT = average operating margin over the years shown × latest-year revenue × (1 − normalized tax); then + D&A − maintenance capex (write A). Unlevered (pre-interest, attributable to all capital). Capitalized at the 9–11% rate band (read as a WACC proxy). Enterprise → equity bridge applied: + cash − total debt.

Years: 2025, 2024, 2023, 2022, 2021

v1 simplifications: Maintenance capex (degraded) deducted in full cash (write A): EPV = (NOPAT + D&A − maintenance capex) / WACC; no tax shield on the capex term. Maintenance-capex methods diverge by 220% (> 50%); estimate is degraded. Capex doubled within two years (AI-hog rule): flagged; the spike is treated as growth, not maintenance — owner earnings carry extra uncertainty. Share-based compensation is left as a real expense (not added back).

Buffett owner-earnings value

Normalized owner earnings are non-positive over the years shown; earnings power cannot be capitalized.

Owner earnings = average net income + average D&A − maintenance capex (zero-growth floor; no ΔNWC). Levered (starts from net income, already after interest — an equity-holder stream). Capitalized at the 9–11% rate band (read as a cost-of-equity proxy). No enterprise→equity bridge: the capitalized result is already equity value (subtracting debt would double-count interest).

Years: 2025, 2024, 2023, 2022, 2021

v1 simplifications: Owner earnings = net income + D&A − maintenance capex (degraded); the working-capital change is excluded (maintenance ΔNWC ≈ 0; growth ΔNWC is carried in growth value, not double-counted). Maintenance-capex methods diverge by 220% (> 50%); estimate is degraded. Capex doubled within two years (AI-hog rule): flagged; the spike is treated as growth, not maintenance — owner earnings carry extra uncertainty. One-time items are not separately normalized (multi-year averaging smooths them partially). Share-based compensation is left as a real expense (not added back); see the SBC/OE disclosure. Capitalized at the 9–11% band as a cost-of-equity proxy; no leverage premium applied. Net debt or owner earnings is unavailable, so no adjustment is made.

Reproduction value = tangible net assets $963.51M + capitalized R&D $668.70M（FY 2025, 2024, 2023, 2022, 2021） = $9.79 / sh. Reproduction value = tangible net assets (equity − goodwill − intangibles) + capitalized R&D (5y straight-line), ÷ diluted shares.

Moat reading: Franchise test compares earnings power (EPV) against reproduction value on both AV_conservative (tangible + capitalized R&D) and AV_reproduction (conservative + acquired-reset proxy). Both must clear the franchise multiple for a moat signal; near it, a commodity; below it, value destruction. A directional reading, not a verdict.

Growth value gated to zero — capex doubled within two years (AI-hog); growth credit stays in the owner-earnings DCF only.

Window FY 2025, 2024, 2023, 2022, 2021 · discount band 9%–11% · normalized tax 0% (Average effective tax rate over 5 year(s), capped at the statutory 21%.) · diluted shares.

How to read intrinsic value

SEC 13F · holders

Superinvestors Holding This Security

3 holders · $36.7M combined · this quarter +2 opened / -1 exited

This quarter2 opened1 added1 exited
Holders 1 → 3 · last 6q
Exited this quarter (1)
Ray Dalio

SEC 13F · notes

Written summary

Gitlab Inc-Cl A (GTLB) is held by 3 of the superinvestors tracked on Compounder, with a combined $36.7M in reported 13F value. The largest position belongs to Fred Martin, where it makes up 0.4% of the portfolio.

Other notable holders by value include Quincy Lee (3.5% of its book) and Jeremy Grantham (0.0% of its book).

Over the latest quarter, 2 of the tracked filers opened a new position in GTLB, 1 added to existing ones, 0 trimmed, and 1 sold out entirely.

Holder counts and values reflect the most recent SEC Form 13F filings, through the quarter ended 2026-03-31. Source: SEC EDGAR. A 13F shows only long US-listed positions and can lag the real portfolio by up to 45 days, so this is disclosed long ownership, not a complete picture.

How to read a 13F

SEC 13F · co-ownership

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Also on

Sources· SEC EDGAR 13F as of 2026-03-31 · filed 2026-05-15

Educational data only — not investment advice. 13F positions are self-reported and can lag up to 45 days.

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